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Lowering desired family size is a necessary precondition for fertility declines in high-fertility settings.
Although accumulated evidence links socio-economic developments to changing fertility desires, little
research has disentangled the relative importance of key socio-economic determinants. Combining
individual- and community-level data from Demographic and Health Surveys in 34 sub-Saharan
African (SSA) countries, we compare the relative role of different socio-economic factors on fertility
desires at the individual, community, and country levels. Results show that at the individual level,
women’s education has a stronger effect than household wealth and area of residence. The high levels of
reported desired family size in rural parts of SSA are mainly a consequence of relatively lower levels of
education. The relative impact of women’s education is even stronger at the community level. Our
findings are robust to alternative measures of fertility preferences and strengthen previous findings
regarding the relationship between fertility and women’s education.
Supplementary material for this article is available at: https://doi.org/10.1080/00324728.2021.1892170
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Introduction
The secular decline in fertility that has been taking
place in many parts of the world is one of the defin-
ing processes shaping the demographic and socio-
economic landscape of our times. Following the
end of the Second World War, Asia and Latin
America underwent a remarkably fast fertility tran-
sition (a process that had taken the European pio-
neers more than a century). Fertility declines in
these regions were possible initially due to high
unwanted fertility, and gradually then to lower
desired family size, facilitated by the availability of
birth control methods and other family planning ser-
vices (Feyisetan and Casterline 2000; Casterline
2009). In contrast, sub-Saharan Africa (SSA)
showed little to no sign of fertility decline until the
1980s, and ongoing fertility declines are happening
at a much slower pace compared with other
regions, and sometimes even stalling (Bongaarts
2008; Ezeh et al. 2009; Kebede et al. 2019). More
puzzling even, fertility in SSA has remained high
despite the increase in the availability of birth
control and other family planning services, as well
as substantial improvements in child mortality.
The reasons put forward for this so-called ‘African
exceptionalism’ (Bongaarts and Casterline 2013) are
manifold. Sustained high fertility could be associated
with the strong pronatalist attitudes prevalent in the
region (Caldwell and Caldwell 1990). Vast empirical
evidence has confirmed that differences in fertility
preferences can explain much of the variation in fer-
tility across countries (Hirschman 1994; Pritchett
1994; Bryant 2007). Despite the recent emergence
of a changing mentality towards the adoption of
family limitation in a number of African countries,
the desired number of children at any given level
of fertility in SSA is considerably higher than in
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other less developed regions (Bongaarts 2017; Cas-
terline and Agyei-Mensah 2017). Comparisons
between the two most recent Demographic and
Health Surveys (DHSs) from the countries included
in our study reveal a negligible decline (or even
increase) in the mean ideal number of children
over time (see Table A1 in the supplementary
material). More strikingly even, in contrast to other
less developed regions, where people had already
started to desire smaller family sizes at the onset of
the fertility transition, in SSA we observe only a
very modest excess of actual over desired fertility
at this stage. As indicated by the diagonal line in
Figure 1, realized fertility in the region is close to
desired fertility, and in a number of countries, ideal
family size is even higher than actual fertility.
Despite the strong connection between desired
family size and its later realization, few studies
have looked at fertility desires in SSA from a quan-
titative, cross-national comparative perspective. One
possible reason is that fertility preferences appear to
be less stable in the less developed country context
than in late transition societies. As Trinitapoli and
Yeatman (2018) have pointed out, however, this
should come as no surprise, given that young
people’s lives are even less predictable in less devel-
oped countries than they are in economically more
stable nations. Rather, researchers should embrace
the fluctuating nature of fertility behaviour in less
developed countries as valid information about
shifts in the broader societal conditions of fertility
desires. According to classical demographic tran-
sition theory, high fertility results from the desire
for large families in response to socio-economic
demands, rather than a failure to achieve desired
smaller family sizes (Notestein 1945; Easterlin
1975; Schultz 2001). By increasing the direct costs,
as well as the opportunity costs, of children,
changes in socio-economic settings can erode the
economic basis for high desired fertility. According
to Bongaarts (2017), differences in the pace of ferti-
lity decline between Africa and other less developed
regions can be explained to a large extent through
the slower pace of socio-economic development in
Africa.
In the ongoing debate about persistent high ferti-
lity in SSA, this study aims to disentangle the relative
effects of different socio-economic factors on ferti-
lity desires. Specifically, we are interested in the rela-
tive contribution of education compared with wealth
and area of residence. Since the importance of differ-
ent socio-economic factors can vary by level of
spatial aggregation, and higher-level effects can
mask combined individual-level effects or an inde-
pendent effect at the national level, we apply a multi-
level framework to differentiate effects on fertility
preferences at the individual, community, and
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Figure 1 Mean ideal number of children vs total fertility: women aged 15–49 in 34 SSA countries
Note: The diagonal line shows where ideal (desired) fertility is equal to actual (realized) fertility.
Source: Authors’ analysis of data from the most recent Demographic and Health Survey in each country, from the period
2006–07 to 2018.
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This type of analysis is particularly promising for
SSA, where fertility continues to be well above
four children per woman in the majority of countries,
and more than one-third of women aged 20–39 have
no formal education (WIC 2018). The results of this
study can, thus, advance our understanding of the
link between education and fertility, and help us to
assess the gains from future investments in
education.
Education and fertility desires
Since the pioneering work of Cochrane (1979),
various micro-level studies have emphasized the
importance of education, particularly for females,
in explaining fertility decline (Castro Martin 1995;
Kravdal 2002; Bongaarts 2010). Education is gener-
ally associated with lower desired family size
(Cleland 2002; Behrman 2015). Due to a strong
economic paradigm in fertility research, however,
the role of education is typically seen in conjunction
with changes in income and other development indi-
cators. In line with predictions from the neoclassical
economic models of fertility, increases in women’s
education negatively affect their fertility preferences
by increasing forgone income (Becker 1981). Simi-
larly, unified growth theory explains that industrial-
ization expands not only urbanization and income,
but also the incentive to accumulate human capital,
which subsequently leads to fertility decline (Galor
2011). This conflation of education with other devel-
opment indicators becomes most obvious in the con-
struction of the Human Development Index (HDI),
which lumps indicators of human capital (mean of
years of schooling for adults aged 25+ years and
expected years of schooling for children of school
entry age) together with per capita gross national
income and life expectancy. Yet, recognizing and
determining the importance of human capital rela-
tive to other driving forces of development has
important policy implications—particularly in
achieving the sustainable development goals (Lutz
2017)—which is why we look at them separately.
Women’s education has also been shown to affect
fertility desires through a number of non-economic
pathways, such as increased knowledge and changing
attitudes around fertility regulation (Cochrane 1979;
Cleland and Wilson 1987), promotion of new norms
(Caldwell 1976, 1980), social interactions (Bongaarts
and Watkins 1996), enhanced autonomy of women
(Jejeebhoy 1995), and improved child health
(Pamuk et al. 2011). These pathways can be
complex, and several studies have found the effects
of women’s education on desired number of children
to be context dependent, varying across regions
(Castro Martin 1995; Jejeebhoy 1995; Günther and
Harttgen 2016; Casterline and Agyei-Mensah 2017),
countries (Muhoza et al. 2014; Behrman 2015), and
communities within countries (Kravdal 2002).
Rather than being merely a function of individual
socio-economic status (SES), women’s fertility prefer-
ences are also influenced by the level of socio-econ-
omic development of the community and country in
which they reside. The desired number of children
among uneducated women from poorer and mostly
illiterate communities differs markedly from the
number of children desired by uneducated women
living in richer, mostly literate communities, which is
why we need to account for these different levels in
assessing the relative importance of education.
Social scientists have long emphasized the impact
of broader societal norms and institutions on individ-
ual family size preferences. Ryder (1973) showed
that family size preferences are inherently sociologi-
cal (rather than biological) and reflect the dominant
paradigms of the time within a given society. More
recently, Moultrie and Timæus (2014) argued that
fertility trends are shaped by country-specific
norms and institutions that can change over time
and that regulate fertility. There are many possible
explanations for context-dependent effects of SES
on the desired number of children. First, individual
norms and attitudes are acquired through social
interactions, and depend on the stock of knowledge
available in the vicinity, the level of urbanization
(which regulates the speed at which new ideas circu-
late), and the economic resources at the commu-
nity’s disposal. Second, individuals tend to imitate
the reproductive behaviours prevalent in their com-
munity, simply to gain acceptance and avoid criticism
from others (Kravdal 2002). This effect is particu-
larly strong in societies without developed welfare
states, where informal support networks represent
the main form of insurance, making individuals
more likely to conform to values and attitudes
shared by the community (Caldwell and Caldwell
1987). In addition to these community-level effects,
socio-economic developments at the national level
might affect individual fertility preferences. Overall
educational attainment, for example, influences fer-
tility-related content communicated through the
mass media, as well as the image of women in
society more broadly. Socio-economic development
affects support for family planning efforts and
national reproductive health campaigns aiming to
improve health-related infrastructures while redu-
cing the relative importance of child labour.
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To date and to the best of our knowledge, no single
study on SSA has systematically and simultaneously
assessed the role of education relative to other socio-
economic indicators at these three levels (individual,
community, and country) in determining fertility
intentions. Kravdal (2002) showed the independent
effect of individual- and community-level education
on actual fertility in 22 SSA countries. However,
that study did not look at intentions, and since
detailed information on household wealth was not
available in DHSs before 2003, it could only disen-
tangle the effect of education from that of area of
residence. Hence, mediating factors that may be
affected by women’s education, such as household
wealth, were disregarded. In contrast, by looking at
women’s ideal number of children at the three
levels, we are able to study this important (perhaps
the most important) determinant of actual fertility.
Our examination of fertility desires according to
individual education, household wealth quintile,
and area of residence for the 34 SSA countries
reveals a pattern consistent with these arguments
(Figure 2). First, mean ideal number of children
declines with improvements in SES (education,
wealth) and is lower in urban than rural settings.
Despite possible issues of collinearity between the
three indicators, women’s educational status
appears to be the strongest predictor of mean ideal
number of children. Second, fertility desires by
SES vary substantially across countries within SSA.
This dispersion is particularly strong among poor,
uneducated, and rural women compared with their
wealthy, better educated, and urban counterparts.
Fertility preferences: Definitions and
measurement issues
The terms used to denote fertility desires or ideal
family size vary, as do the corresponding questions
included in surveys (Thomson 2015). For this
reason, we clarify here the terminology we use and
the advantages and disadvantages of different ways
of measuring fertility preferences. In addition, we
present how we respond to the challenge of non-
numeric responses (NNRs) to questions about ferti-
lity preferences and the possible preference for
stating round numbers, such as ten children instead
of nine or eleven.
 
Note:  
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Figure 2 Mean ideal number of children by individual-level socio-economic status: women aged 15–49 in 34
SSA countries
Note: For individual education, the three categories shown are None (no formal education), Primary (completed primary
education), and Sec+ (completed secondary education or more).
Source: As for Figure 1.
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This study uses ‘ideal number of children’ and
‘desired family size’ interchangeably as measures of
women’s intentions. Desired family size is usually
defined as the number of children a respondent
would like to have based on their own assessment
of the costs and benefits of childbearing, and ‘if
there were no subjective or economic problems
involved in regulating fertility’ (Easterlin 1975,
p. 82). It was first consistently and internationally
measured by the World Fertility Surveys (Light-
bourne 1985). Later, DHSs employed a range of
questions to collect detailed information on fertility
desires and construct multiple indicators of family
size preferences. These indicators have been used
to measure unmet need for family planning, assess
reproductive norms, and forecast future develop-
ments in actual fertility. The first type of question
asks respondents about their fertility preferences
prospectively. For parents, the question is: ‘Would
you like to have another child, or would you prefer
not to have any more children?’ Related questions
are also asked about desired waiting time, for those
who want an additional child. In addition, the
surveys include questions about the wantedness of
recent births or pregnancies.
DHSs also provide more direct indicators of
family size preferences based on the ideal number
of children assessed retrospectively, using the follow-
ing question: ‘If you could go back to the time you did
not have any children and could choose exactly the
number of children to have in your whole life, how
many would that be?’ For childless respondents,
this question measures desires prospectively: ‘If
you could choose exactly the number of children to
have in your whole life, how many would that be?’
The ideal number of children is the most used
measure of fertility preference; however, it has
several limitations (McClelland 1983; Bongaarts
1990; Casterline and El-Zeini 2007; Johnson-Hanks
2007).
First, indicators of ideal family size are subject to a
social desirability bias in which responses may
strongly reflect the society’s overall ideal family
size (Livi Bacci 2001). For example, the two-child
family—one boy and one girl—has long been con-
sidered an ideal family composition in many
western European countries. On the other hand,
large household size is generally considered a
societal ideal in many SSA countries.
Second, individual plans may change over the life
course following changes in economic, social, health,
and other prevailing conditions (Freedman et al.
1965; Hayford 2009; Iacovou and Tavares 2011).
Experiences associated with childbirth or child loss,
and changes in individuals’ educational attainment
or career trajectories, may contribute to changes in
desired family size (Bongaarts 1990; Bankole and
Westoff 1998; Morgan and Rackin 2010). Each
birth experience provides new information that
could change family size desires and expectations
(Namboodiri 1983). Hence, fertility intentions
should be examined at different parities (Yamaguchi
and Ferguson 1995).
Third, rationalization or ‘post facto revision’ of
family size preferences may lead respondents to
adjust their ideal number of children upwards
based on their actual number of living children. In
our sample of 34 SSA countries, 75 per cent of
women (aged 45–49) reported an ideal number of
children higher than their number of living children,
and about 8 per cent of sampled women stated the
same number of children for both indicators.
Fourth, women’s fertility intentions and expec-
tations are heavily influenced by the fertility prefer-
ences of their husbands and/or other household
members. Many empirical studies have presented
women’s fertility desires as the main indicator of fer-
tility norms and decisions, which are determinant for
their subsequent fertility. However, partners’ diver-
gent desired family sizes are the primary source of
differences between women’s fertility desires and
their expectations (Miller and Pasta 1996; Thomson
1997). A study in Nigeria showed that when a
husband and wife disagree on the desire for an
additional child, the preferences of both are
equally important for subsequent actual fertility
(Bankole 1995). However, survey results in which
both men and women were interviewed revealed
that partners often share similar fertility desires
(Rutstein and Rojas 2006; Testa 2006).
Fifth, in high-fertility settings, women who provide
numeric answers to questions of ideal family size
may not be able to state desires precisely, which
might lead to ‘number heaping’: the tendency to
round numbers, such as reporting ten children
instead of nine or eleven (see Figure A1 in the sup-
plementary material). In countries such as Chad
and Niger, the vast majority of women state ten as
an ideal number of children.
Despite these limitations and measurement issues,
indicators of women’s fertility desires can provide a
quantitative base for assessing overall fertility
norms and demands in the population, by looking
at the granularity in the available data. For
example, analysing the ideal number of children con-
trolling for parity, as implemented in this study, can
minimize biases associated with rationalization.
Moreover, several studies have shown strong
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connections between women’s fertility desires and
achieved fertility (Pritchett and Summers 1994;
Günther and Harttgen 2016). As Van de Kaa
(2001) explained, fertility preference indicators
play a causal role in theories of fertility decline.
Non-numeric responses
In DHSs, a small but significant proportion of
women who respond to questions about ideal
family size do not give a numerical response, but
instead provide NNRs, such as ‘it is up to God’, ‘as
many as possible’, or ‘I do not know’. Supplementary
Table A2 presents the proportion of women who
provided NNRs to the ideal family size question in
34 SSA countries by survey year. In earlier surveys,
a substantial proportion of women provided NNRs.
For example, in the first surveys in Nigeria (1990)
and Burkina Faso (1993), about 61 and 25 per cent
of women, respectively, provided NNRs. In recent
surveys, however, the share of NNRs has declined
significantly. In Burkina Faso’s 2010 DHS, for
example, only 3.5 per cent of women provided
NNRs.
Although many researchers have taken such
responses as missing values, studies have shown
that NNRs are meaningful in understanding fertility
transition theories (Hayford and Agadjanian 2011;
Frye and Bachan 2017). In response to Coale’s pre-
condition for a lasting fertility decline, supposed to
happen when childbearing is ‘within the calculus of
conscious choice’ (Coale 1973, p. 65), demographers
often associate NNRs with a ‘pre-transitional
mindset’, under which women lack deliberate
control over their fertility. On the other hand, a
decline in NNRs to ideal family size questions is a
precursor of fertility transitions (Caldwell 1976;
Van de Walle 1992). Supplementary Figure A2
shows the prevalence of NNRs by mean ideal
number of children across SSA countries. It reveals
that NNRs are more prevalent in pre-/early transi-
tional contexts where the mean ideal number of chil-
dren (and thus total fertility) is higher.
Moreover, research has shown that the ‘up to
God’ and ‘I do not know’ responses to the ideal
family size question may reflect respondents’ SES
(e.g. educational attainment), as well as the uncer-
tainty stemming from high child mortality (Riley
et al. 1993; Sandberg 2005). A study in Malawi
showed that better educated women tend to
answer numerically, and report smaller ideal family
sizes (Yeatman 2009). Supplementary Figure A3 dis-
plays the average proportion of NNRs in SSA by
individual SES, in the most recent surveys. NNRs
are generally higher among non-educated, poor,
and rural women. The average proportion of NNRs
among women with no formal education is about 7
per cent, while it is below 2 per cent among those
with completed secondary education or higher. The
prevalence of NNRs is also negatively associated
with increasing community-level SES, particularly
community-level education (Figure 3).
Due to their association with predictors of family
size preferences, excluding NNRs from our sample
data could cause severe selection bias. However, as
shown in supplementary Table A2, the proportion
of women providing NNRs to fertility preferences
in SSA is declining over time. Thus, the bias associ-
ated with NNRs could be minimized by employing
only the most recent DHS data, the approach used
in this paper.
Data
This study is based primarily on DHS micro-level
data from 18,520 clusters across 34 SSA countries.
Within each country, the survey made use of a two-
stage cluster sampling technique and standardized
questionnaires to collect comparable, reliable, and
nationally representative data on population
health, living conditions, and demographic charac-
teristics of households. Our data set pools infor-
mation about 434,447 women aged 15–49 (see
Table 1 and supplementary Table A3).
As discussed earlier, DHSs provide multiple indi-
cators of women’s preferences regarding family size.
This study uses the most direct and easiest to inter-
pret indicator, namely ideal number of children. In
all 34 countries, women were asked: ‘If you could
go back to the time you didn’t have any children
and could choose exactly the number of children to
have in your whole life, how many would that be?’
To minimize measurement limitations and associ-
ated biases of this indicator, our sample is limited
to the most recent surveys, and the analyses con-
ducted by parity.
To examine the effect of individual education on
fertility desires, we categorize women’s educational
attainment into five levels: no formal education,
incomplete primary education, completed primary
education, some secondary education, and com-
pleted secondary education or more. Recognizing
the possible independent effect of community-level
education, we derive the mean years of schooling
(MYS) of women in each sample cluster. To test
whether less educated women could be affected by
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the reproductive behaviour of potentially influential
women in the community (including better educated
ones), we categorize the distribution of cluster-
specific MYS approximately into thirds, with <3.2
MYS categorized as ‘low’, ≥3.2 but <6.4 years as
‘medium’, and ≥6.4 years as ‘high’. To assess the
impact of country-level education, in line with
Pamuk et al. (2011), we include the logged pro-
portion of working-age population (aged 20–64,
both sexes combined) with lower secondary edu-
cation or higher according to the Wittgenstein
Centre’s database (WIC 2018). The rationale given
by Pamuk et al. (2011) for using this variable at the
country level was that ‘the presumed imitative
effect whereby less educated mothers model the be-
haviour of their better educated counterparts would
be less important at the national level than at the
community level. On the other hand, a higher pro-
portion of both men and women with at least a sec-
ondary school credential would not only provide a
general indication of social and economic develop-
ment, but would also indicate the availability of a
more highly skilled work force’ (Pamuk et al. 2011,
p. 641). Results from sensitivity analyses using an
alternative measure of national-level human capital
are provided in the ‘Sensitivity and robustness
analysis’ subsection.
The impact of household economic resources on
women’s fertility desires is examined using quintiles
of the household wealth distribution. This categori-
cal variable is constructed using principal component
analysis on information about assets and the avail-
ability of important household services, such as
water supply, electricity, radio, and type of flooring
(Filmer and Pritchett 2001). While this measure cer-
tainly has its limitations (Vyas and Kumaranayake
2006), it has been widely used, particularly in the
absence of more detailed expenditure data. In
addition, for the purpose of comparing the relative
contributions of education and household wealth to
the formation of fertility intentions, this asset-based
measure is preferable to expenditure-based
measures of household wealth. Not only would it
be difficult to argue that a sudden increase in house-
hold consumption immediately led to a change in fer-
tility intentions, it would also be difficult to compare
a short-term measure with a stable long-term
measure such as education.
At the community level, a categorical indicator of
relative wealth (poor, medium, rich) is constructed
from the mean of wealth quintile scores for all
households within the cluster. At the national level
the impact of economic resources is assessed using
a country’s per capita gross domestic product
(GDP, purchasing power parity (PPP) in constant
2017 international dollars) around the time of the
survey. These data are obtained from the World
Development Indicators database (World Bank
Figure 3 Percentage of women aged 15–49 providing non-numeric responses to ideal family size questions in
34 SSA countries, by community-level socio-economic status (education and wealth)
Note: MYS=mean years of schooling.
Source: As for Figure 1.
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2019) and included in our analysis as a logged con-
tinuous variable.
In addition, in our multilevel analysis we control
for the impact of area of residence as defined and
reported in DHSs (urban vs rural). Similarly, we
control for region-specific differences in fertility
desires within SSA by including dummy variables
for central and western Africa (reference category),
eastern Africa, and southern Africa.
Another major factor associated with lower ferti-
lity desires is availability and use of family planning
services. Information on the intensity of family plan-
ning activities at the national level is available
through the Family Planning Effort Index (FPEI)
(Kuang and Brodsky 2016). The FPEI was intended
to measure the strength and weakness of national
family planning efforts in four main dimensions:
policy context, service provision, monitoring and
evaluation, and access to fertility control methods.
The index was constructed based on the assessment
of 10–15 experts from government, the private
sector, academia, non-governmental organizations,
and international agencies in each country, and is
available periodically between 1972 and 2014 for a
large number of countries. The national experts
rated 36 items of their country’s family planning





































Angola 2015–16 14,377 625 6,955 12.7 40.9 – 4.72
Burkina Faso 2010 16,526 573 1,350 11.6 23.0 45.6 5.07
Benin 2017–18 13,591 750 1,931 17.1 41.2 57.2 4.32
Burundi 2016–17 16,909 554 682 8.2 11.2 55.6 3.75
DR Congo 2013–14 3,955 153 760 43.3 40.0 40.2 5.95
Cameroon 2018 12,269 469 3,603 39.8 50.1 38.6 5.30
Chad 2015 13,550 624 2,073 10.3 22.1 45.5 7.76
Comoros 2012 4,740 252 1,396 32.8 27.9 – 5.15
Congo 2011 10,149 384 5,595 37.6 62.2 38.0 4.61
Cote d’Ivoire 2011 9,218 351 2,726 19.1 48.7 43.4 5.12
Ethiopia 2016 13,928 638 1,529 10.3 18.2 58.9 4.16
Gabon 2012 7,911 336 17,100 39.9 85.0 – 4.49
Gambia 2013 9,899 281 1,570 25.6 55.7 46.5 6.00
Ghana 2014 9,233 427 3,833 53.8 50.7 53.8 4.03
Guinea 2018 9,230 401 2,498 24.9 39.1 4.6 5.44
Kenya 2014 14,243 1,593 2,747 54.2 23.6 49.4 3.39
Lesotho 2014 6,608 399 2,672 27.0 24.8 42.2 2.53
Liberia 2013 8,817 322 770 28.4 47.5 45.6 4.53
Madagascar 2009 16,330 600 1,528 14.3 29.4 47.3 4.33
Malawi 2015 24,234 850 1,114 34.2 15.7 47.6 3.65
Mali 2018 9,455 379 2,283 11.6 34.7 50.9 5.79
Mozambique 2011 13,604 610 913 16.7 30.5 43.0 4.46
Namibia 2013 9,053 545 8,858 45.1 40.8 51.2 3.30
Niger 2012 10,201 480 807 4.7 17.3 49.8 8.56
Nigeria 2018 40,660 1400 5,155 42.2 42.8 40.7 6.11
Rwanda 2014 13,362 491 1,516 11.3 24.0 73.5 3.15
Sierra Leone 2013 15,864 434 1,570 21.2 38.0 41.1 4.67
South Africa 2016 8,485 750 12,393 71.2 54.5 60.8 2.87
Swaziland 2006–07 4,947 274 7,141 39.5 22.3 52.3 2.45
Tanzania 2015 12,631 606 2,421 14.8 28.8 46.6 4.56
Togo 2013–14 9,217 330 1,280 18.1 37.2 50.3 4.00
Uganda 2016 18,033 695 1,738 19.2 15.1 50.9 4.44
Zambia 2018 13,340 545 3,520 45.0 38.4 43.9 4.63
Zimbabwe 2015 19,878 399 1,709 68.0 33.0 58.7 3.81
Note: ‘–’ indicates missing data.
Source: Authors’ analysis of data from the most recent Demographic and Health Survey in each country, from the period 2006–07 to 2018.
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programmes on a scale from one (no effort) to ten.
The FPEI was then calculated by taking the
average of the 36 ratings as a percentage of the
maximum possible score.
While the FPEI takes account of the input side of
family planning, the output side (e.g. actual use of
modern contraceptives) is excluded from our analy-
sis for two main reasons. First, contraceptive use is to
some extent a consequence of fertility preferences,
not an explanatory factor. The desire for smaller
families creates a demand for family planning ser-
vices and, keeping all other factors constant,
women with lower desired family sizes are more
likely to use contraceptives than those with high fer-
tility preferences. Second, women’s contraceptive
use is linked to their SES. Hence, including contra-
ceptive use in the analysis would underestimate the
total effect of the antecedent background factors,
such as education and economic resources. More-
over, the study aims to compare the effects of the
demand-side determinants of fertility preferences,
setting aside the supply-side factors.
Descriptive country-specific sample statistics
including the number of clusters, number of
women sampled, and country-level socio-economic
indicators included in the analysis are provided in
Table 1. Mean ideal number of children varies sub-
stantially across SSA countries, ranging from 2.5 in
Swaziland to 8.6 in Niger. Likewise, considerable
heterogeneity is observed in socio-economic devel-
opment. GDP per capita, for example, is as low as
$682 in Burundi, while in Gabon it is as high as
$17,000. The proportion of working-age adults with
at least lower secondary education ranges from 4.7
per cent in Niger to 71.2 per cent in South Africa.
In Gabon 85 per cent of the population is urban,
compared with only 11 per cent in Burundi. Unlike
the other socio-economic indicators, the FPEI
index shows little variation between sample
countries: at 49.8, the FPEI for Niger, the country
with the highest ideal number of children, is not
very different from the FPEI for Swaziland at the
other end of the spectrum (52.3).
Method
In order to assess the relative impact of education on
fertility desires, we employ multilevel Poisson
regression models to account for the hierarchical
nature of our data. Failure to control for the corre-
lation resulting from the characteristics shared by
women within the same DHS cluster and clusters
within the same country could mask underlying
unobserved heterogeneity and lead to biased esti-
mates. Because of the small number of observations
at the household level, we settle for a more parsimo-
nious three-level model where women (level 1) are
nested within clusters (level 2), which are again
nested within 34 SSA countries (level 3). The base
model is specified as follows:
log(YNi,k,c,t) = a+ b1agei,k,c,t + b2educi,k,c,t
+ b3wealthi,k,c,t + b4rurali,k,c,t
+Xai,k,c,t +Xbi,k,c,t +UK +Uc
(1)
where individual i is nested in cluster k and clusters
are grouped within country c. The subscript t rep-
resents the survey year, which varies among sample
countries (see Table 1). Since the responses to ques-
tions on fertility ideals heavily depend on the
number of children a woman already has (rationaliz-
ation), equation (1) is estimated separately for sub-
samples of women at different parities, where N =
0, 1–2, 3–4, and 5+. The outcome variable Yi,k,c
measures the ideal number of children. The error
terms UK and Uc capture cluster- and country-
specific deviation from the conditional mean (inter-
cept), respectively. They are assumed to be normally
distributed with constant variance. We control for
women’s age at time of survey (agei,k,c,t), as well as
individual-level educational status (educi,k,c,t),
household wealth quintile (wealthi,k,c,t), and place
of residence (rurali,k,c,t). Moreover, we implement
controls at the community level (Xai,k,c,t), and
country level (Xbi,k,c,t): for the community, mean
years of schooling of women of reproductive age,
andmean wealth quintile score; at country level, pro-
portion of adult population with at least lower sec-
ondary education, log GDP per capita, FPEI, and
other geographical indicators. We develop eight
models to test the relative impact of our indicators
at multiple levels on the desired number of children.
Results
Education and household wealth
Table 2 reports the multilevel model estimates that
compare the relative importance of education and
economic resources in shaping women’s fertility
desires at the individual, community, and country
levels. Model (1) shows the bivariate effect of
selected individual-, community-, and country-level
variables on desired number of children, adjusting
for age of women and number of living children.
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Table 2 Estimated rate ratios of ideal number of children from four models: women aged 15–49 in 34 SSA countries












None (reference) 1.00 1.00 1.00
Incomplete primary 0.94 0.93–0.94 0.95 0.94–0.96 – 0.95 0.95–0.96
Completed primary 0.89 0.88–0.90 0.91 0.91–0.92 – 0.92 0.91–0.92
Incomplete secondary 0.84 0.83–0.84 0.87 0.87–0.88 – 0.88 0.87–0.88
Completed secondary or
higher
0.77 0.76–0.77 0.81 0.80–0.81 – 0.82 0.81–0.83
Quintile of wealth index
Poorest (q1) (reference) 1.00 1.00 1.00
Poorer (q2) 0.96 0.96–0.97 – 0.97 0.97–0.98 0.98 0.97–0.98
Middle (q3) 0.93 0.92–0.93 – 0.96 0.95–0.96 0.97 0.97–0.98
Richer (q4) 0.89 0.88–0.89 – 0.94 0.93–0.94 0.96 0.96–0.97
Richest (q5) 0.81 0.80–0.81 – 0.88 0.87–0.89 0.94 0.93–0.95
Area of residence
Urban (reference) 1.00
Rural 1.21 1.20–1.22 – – –
Community level
MYS (women aged 15–49)
[0–3.2) (reference) 1.00 1.00 1.00
[3.2–6.4) 0.79 0.79–0.80 0.84 0.83–0.84 – 0.88 0.87–0.89
6.4 or more 0.65 0.64–0.65 0.72 0.71–0.73 – 0.79 0.78–0.80
Mean wealth index quintile score
Poor [0–2.4) (reference) 1.00 1.00 1.00
Medium [2.4–3.64) 0.86 0.85–0.87 – 0.88 0.88–0.89 0.94 0.93–0.95
Rich [3.64–5] 0.74 0.73–0.74 – 0.80 0.79–0.81 0.92 0.91–0.93
Country level





0.79 0.68–0.92 0.93 0.82–1.06 – 0.92 0.78–1.08
GDP per capita (PPP
2017 $) (natural log)
0.84 0.75–0.95 – 0.85 0.76–0.95 0.95 0.84–1.08
Family planning effort
index (natural log)





Eastern Africa 0.78 0.69–0.88 – – –
Southern Africa 0.49 0.41–0.59 – – –
Random effects MRR MRR MRR
Level 3 (Country) – 1.22 1.27 1.22
Level 2 (Cluster) – 1.15 1.17 1.15
No. of countries 34 34 34 34
No. of clusters 18,416 18,416 18,416 18,416
No. of women 434,447 434,447 434,447 434,447
Notes: RR=Rate Ratio; MRR=Median Rate Ratio; CI = confidence interval; MYS =mean years of schooling. Model (1) shows the
bivariate effects of all variables; Model (2) shows the effects of education variables at all levels; Model (3) shows the effects of wealth
variables at all levels; Model (4) includes both education and wealth variables. Age and number of living children are included as
additional explanatory variables in all models.
Source: As for Table 1.
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Older women tend to report higher desired numbers
of children. Individual education and household
economic resources both show strong and statisti-
cally significant relationships with fertility desires.
Desired number of children is estimated to decrease
with women’s level of education. Relative to those
with no education, estimated ideal number of chil-
dren drops by 11 per cent for those with completed
primary education, 16 per cent for those with incom-
plete secondary education, and 23 per cent for those
with at least completed secondary education. Like
education, the effect of household economic
resources shows a negative bivariate association
with desired number of children, where women
from higher wealth quintiles desire fewer children.
However, the difference in desired number of chil-
dren between the lowest and highest wealth quintiles
is smaller than the difference between having no
education and having at least completed secondary
education. Compared with women from the
poorest households (q1), fertility desires among
those from the middle wealth quintile (q3) are 7
per cent lower and among women from the wealth-
iest households (q5) are 19 per cent lower.
These associations between education, household
wealth, and desired number of children are also
apparent at the community level (Model (1)). For
women residing in communities that are relatively
highly educated (≥6.4 years of education on
average), ideal number of children is about 35 per
cent lower than for those in communities where
the average educational attainment is ≤3.2 years. A
higher mean wealth quintile score at the community
level also appears to be associated with a lower ideal
number of children, but the bivariate association is
weaker than in the case of education. At the
country level, the proportion of the working-age
population with at least secondary education and
per capita GDP both show considerable negative
associations with desired number of children.
Model (2) focuses on the simultaneous adjustment
of the effect of education at the individual, commu-
nity, and country levels, controlling for age and
number of living children. Increased education con-
tinues to be associated with a strong, statistically sig-
nificant drop in fertility desires at all three levels.
However, the adjusted effects are weaker than the
unadjusted bivariate effects in Model (1). The esti-
mated effect for the proportion of adults (20–64)
with at least a lower secondary education at the
country level appears substantially weaker and stat-
istically insignificant, suggesting that the country-
level effect of education no longer plays a significant
role once individual- and community-level effects
are controlled for. Similarly, in Model (3), the esti-
mated coefficients of the effects of increased econ-
omic resources at all levels turn out to be much
lower than in the bivariate Model (1). However,
the effect of wealth continues to be statistically sig-
nificant and of considerable size at all three levels.
Finally, Model (4) controls for both education and
wealth at all levels simultaneously. Most notably, this
leads to a reduction in the importance of economic
resources at all levels, while the effect of education
proves to be relatively robust to the inclusion of
wealth. At the individual level, the effect of
increased wealth remains statistically significant,
but effect sizes are small: relative to women from
the poorest wealth quintile (q1), desired fertility is
estimated to be only 4–6 per cent lower among
women in q4 and q5. At the community level,
desired fertility for women from the richest neigh-
bourhoods is estimated to be only 8 per cent lower
than for women from the poorest neighbourhoods,
while the difference in rate ratios for the richest
and medium wealth neighbourhoods is no longer
statistically significant. Similarly, at the country
level, the effect of GDP per capita appears substan-
tially weakened and insignificant.
On the other hand, the effect of women’s edu-
cation remains strong and statistically significant.
The rate ratio for women with some secondary edu-
cation is about 12 per cent lower than for those with
no formal education. More strikingly even, at the
community level, women from the most educated
communities are estimated to report a 21 per cent
lower desired number of children compared with
women from the least educated communities. The
effect of country-level education remains statistically
insignificant. Results for the median rate ratio
reported at the bottom of Table 2 indicate a rela-
tively higher level of unobserved heterogeneity at
the country level than the community level. This
suggests that unobserved or unmeasured factors
that are affecting women’s fertility desires have a
stronger impact at the country level than the commu-
nity level. The stronger impact of women’s education
is also apparent for subsamples of women at differ-
ent parities (see supplementary Table A4).
Figure 4 shows the predicted desired number of
children for different combinations of education
and economic resources, based on Model (4) in
Table 2. Panel A shows the simulation of different
combinations of assumptions for education at the
individual and community levels for women from
the lowest wealth quintile (q1), who are living in
the poorest communities of a country with per
capita GDP of only $1,000 and only 10 per cent of
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the population (aged 20–64) having lower secondary
education or more. Under these circumstances,
increasing education at the individual level leads to
a sizable drop in desired number of children. In a
community where women have on average ≤3.2
years of education, lifting a woman from no formal
education to completed secondary education,
keeping all else constant, would reduce her desired
number of children by about 20 per cent (from 7.53
to 6.08 children per woman). In a highly educated
community, where women’s MYS is ≥6.4 on
average, the same hypothetical experiment would
reduce desired fertility from 5.71 to 4.62 children.
However, the impact of higher economic resources
on fertility desires of the most disadvantaged
women is minimal. As displayed in panel B, for
women with no formal education living in a poorly
educated community, increasing household wealth
from the poorest quintile (q1) to the highest (q5)
would result in only a minor drop in the desired
number of children, from 7.53 to 7.10.
The simulation results also reveal a relatively
stronger impact of education compared with wealth
at the community level. Moving a woman with no
formal education from a low-educated community
to a highly educated community would reduce her
fertility preference by about 25 per cent (from 7.53
to 5.71). In contrast, panel B shows that being
lifted from the poorest community wealth quintile
to the richest would lead to only minor changes in
desired number of children: from 7.53 to 7.11 for
the poorest women (q1) and from 7.10 to 6.71 for
the richest women (q5).
Effect of education by area of residence
Extensive evidence from less developed countries
suggests that urban dwellers tend to aim for
smaller family sizes than people living in rural
areas (Eloundou-Enyegue and Giroux 2012). The
main reasons are the higher financial cost of support-
ing a child in the city, lack of available living space,
reduced demand for labour outside an agrarian
context, and higher exposure of urban economies
to negative consequences of economic downturns.
However, the strength of the effect of area of resi-
dence, and whether it is linked to differences in
other socio-economic developments (such as edu-
cation and wealth), is less clear. Consistent with pre-
vious studies, we find a strong bivariate association
between place of residence and fertility desires; rela-
tive to urban residents, the estimated ideal number
of children for rural residents is about 21 per cent
higher (Model (1), Table 2). But as shown in





(A) Impact of education
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(B) Impact of economic resources
Household wealth quintile































Community mean wealth quintile Community MYS < 3.2 > 6.4
Figure 4 Simulations of desired fertility under different individual- and community-level education and econ-
omic resources scenarios
Notes: The simulations are run for a hypothetical country with GDP per capita (PPP) of $1,000, and with only 10 per cent of
the adult population holding lower secondary education or higher. Panel (A) is calculated for the economically most dis-
advantaged women living in the poorest households (q1) within low economic resource communities. In contrast, panel
(B) is calculated for women with no formal education who reside in a low-educated community. Predicted values are
based on Model (4) in Table 2. MYS =mean years of schooling.
Source: As for Figure 1.
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Table 3 Estimated rate ratios of ideal number of children from four further models: women aged 15–49 in 34 SSA
countries












None (reference) 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Incomplete primary 0.95 0.95–0.96 0.95 0.95–0.96 0.95 0.95–0.96 0.94 0.94–0.95
Completed primary 0.91 0.91–0.92 0.92 0.91–0.92 0.92 0.91–0.92 0.91 0.91–0.92
Incomplete secondary 0.87 0.87–0.88 0.88 0.87–0.88 0.88 0.87–0.88 0.87 0.87–0.88
Completed secondary or
higher
0.81 0.81–0.83 0.82 0.81–0.83 0.82 0.81–0.83 0.82 0.81–0.83
Quintile of wealth index
Poorest (q1) (reference) – 1.00 1.00 1.00
Poorer (q2) – 0.98 0.97–0.98 0.98 0.98–0.99 0.98 0.98–0.99
Middle (q3) – 0.97 0.97–0.98 0.97 0.97–0.98 0.97 0.97–0.98
Richer (q4) – 0.96 0.96–0.96 0.96 0.96–0.97 0.96 0.96–0.97
Richest (q5) – 0.94 0.93–0.95 0.94 0.93–0.95 0.94 0.93–0.95
Area of residence
Urban (reference) 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Rural 1.05 1.04–1.06 1.00 0.99–1.01 1.00 0.99–1.01 1.00 0.99–1.01
Community level
MYS (women aged 15–49)
[0–3.2) (reference) 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
[3.2–6.4) 0.85 0.84–0.85 0.88 0.87–0.89 0.88 0.87–0.89 0.88 0.87–0.89
6.4 or more 0.75 0.74–0.76 0.79 0.78–0.80 0.79 0.78–0.80 0.79 0.78–0.80
Mean wealth index quintile score
Poor [0–2.4) (reference) – 1.00 1.00 1.00
Medium [2.4–3.64) – 0.94 0.93–0.95 0.94 0.93–0.95 0.94 0.93–0.95
Rich [3.64–5] – 0.92 0.91–0.93 0.92 0.91–0.93 0.92 0.91–0.93
Country level




0.92 0.83–1.05 0.92 0.78–1.08 0.97 0.86–1.09 0.92 0.81–1.05
GDP per capita (PPP 2017
$) (natural log)
– 0.96 0.84–1.08 1.00 0.90–1.11 1.05 0.93–1.19
Family planning effort score
(natural log)




– – 1.00 1.00
Eastern Africa – – 0.84 0.75–0.94 0.82 0.73–0.93
Southern Africa – – 0.59 0.49–0.71 0.58 0.48–0.73
Random effects MRR MRR MRR MRR
Level 3 (Country) 1.22 1.22 1.16 1.15
Level 2 (Cluster) 1.15 1.15 1.15 1.15
No. of countries 34 34 34 30
No. of clusters 18,416 18,416 18,416 16,803
No. of women 434,447 434,447 434,447 398,389
Notes:RR=Rate Ratio; MRR=Median Rate Ratio; CI = confidence interval; MYS =mean years of schooling. Model (5) shows the effects
of urban/rural residence and education, while Model (6) adds wealth indicators; Models (7) and (8) build onModel (6) by adding subregion
and FPEI, in turn. Age and number of living children are included as additional explanatory variables in all models.
Source: As for Table 1.
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entirely once we control for the various effects of
education. Model (6) extends Model (5) by adding
wealth indicators, but the effect of education
remains unchanged, whereas the coefficient for
area of residence shows a small reduction, reflecting
the lower economic resources of rural compared
with urban residents. High levels of reported
desired fertility in the rural parts of SSA are thus
mainly a consequence of low levels of educational
attainment among the people that live there.
In line with previous studies, our results from
Model (7) confirm large variation in fertility
desires across the larger subregions within SSA.
Although this could derive partly from regional
differences in socio-economic development, our
multilevel results suggest that after controlling for
education, wealth, and rural residence, fertility pre-
ferences are higher among women in central and
western African countries (about 16 and 41 per
cent higher, respectively) than women from eastern
and southern African countries. This confirms the
exceptionally high prevalence of pronatalist atti-
tudes associated with cultural norms that support
childbearing in central and western African
countries (May 2012). The reduction in the
country-level median rate ratio associated with the
inclusion of subregional dummies also indicates the
considerable impact of region-specific unobserved
factors in determining fertility desires in SSA.
Bongaarts (2011) attributed the high levels of
desired fertility in SSA to the relative weakness of
family planning programmes in the region. The sup-
posed channels through which family planning
efforts determine differences across countries in
the speed of fertility decline could correlate with
education. Therefore, in Model (8), Table 3, we
further control for country-level variation in the
intensity of family planning efforts. Their effect, as
measured by the FPEI, turns out to be insignificant,
while the effects of education, at both the individual
and community levels, remain strong and
unchanged.
Sensitivity and robustness analysis
As described earlier, ideal number of children is not
a perfect indicator of fertility preferences. DHSs
provide information on a number of alternative
measures, such as women’s desire to have another
child; the length of time a woman would like to
wait before having another child (if she already has
at least one); and whether the most recent birth
was wanted or not. Casterline and El-Zeini (2007)
suggested that ‘desire for another child’ is indeed
the most valid and reliable indicator of fertility pre-
ferences. Although answers to the DHS question
‘Would you like to have another child, or would you
prefer not to have any more children?’ do not
provide a quantitative measure of the intensity of
women’s fertility desires, tabulating them by parity
can give an insight into women’s desires to stop
childbearing once a target number has been
achieved (Casterline and Agyei-Mensah 2017).
Thus, in order to see if our results hold with an
alternative indicator of fertility preferences, we
respecify our original model (equation (1)) using
desire for another child as the dependent variable.
Since desire to have another child will depend
heavily on the number of children a woman
already has, we estimate this new specification
described by equation (2) separately for subsamples
of women at different parities, N. This also helps to
avoid the potential bias induced through post facto
rationalization with regard to ideal number of chil-
dren.
logit(YN,i,k,c,t) = a+ b1agei,k,c,t + b2educi,k,c,t
+ b3wealthi,k,c,t + b4rurali,k,c,t
+Xai,k,c,t +Xbi,k,c,t + mk+ mc
(2)
where mk  N(0, s2); mc  N(0, s2); Number of
living children N = 1, 2, 3, 4.
The outcome variable YN,i,k,c,t measures whether a
woman i with N surviving children at the time of the
survey, t, wants an additional child or not. The expla-
natory variable agei,k,c,t is categorical in this model,
using five-year age groups, whereas the individual
education, household wealth quantile, and area of
residence (urban/rural) variables are the same as in
equation (1). The community- and country-level
controls also remain unchanged.
Supplementary Table A5 reports the estimated
odds ratios and associated 95 per cent confidence
intervals for the likelihood of wanting another
child, by women’s parity, from the logistic
regressions specified in equation (2). Consistent
with the multilevel Poisson model results, the impor-
tance of area of residence in predicting fertility
desires remains low in the logistic regression: irre-
spective of the number of living children, the odds
of wanting another child among rural residents are
not significantly different from those of their urban
counterparts. At the country level, although insignif-
icant, the proportion of adult population with lower
secondary education or more is negatively associated
with women’s desire for an additional child at all
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parities, whereas per capita GDP is positively associ-
ated with the desire to have another child.
Figure 5 compares the effect of increased women’s
education and household wealth on fertility prefer-
ences for women with two, three, or four living chil-
dren, estimated in three separate model runs.
Irrespective of parity, the odds of wanting another
child drop significantly with increasing education
and the impact of women’s education is estimated
to be higher at higher parities. Relative to those
women with no formal education, the likelihood of
wanting another child for women with completed
secondary education or more is lower by 17 per
cent at parity two, by 34 per cent at parity three,
and by 43 per cent at parity four. The larger drop
in the odds of wanting another child for women
with higher educational status could reflect a stron-
ger family limitation mentality among better edu-
cated women. Household wealth quintiles,
however, do not appear to be related to desires to
have another child in any statistically significant
way. Disregarding parity, preference for an
additional child among women from the lowest
wealth quintile (q1) is not significantly different
from that of women in the highest (q5). These
results confirm our conclusions drawn from the
Poisson models, where women’s education is found
to be a stronger predictor of ideal number of chil-
dren than household wealth.
The relative effects of community education vs
community wealth are also examined (Figure 6).
For women with only two living children, the odds
of wanting another child for those residing in the
least educated communities are about 20 per cent
higher than among those from communities where
the MYS of women of reproductive age is >3.2 but
<6.4 years, and about 35 per cent higher than for
those from (on average) highly educated commu-
nities (MYS≥6.4 years). Moreover, the drop in
odds associated with each higher level of commu-
nity-level education markedly increases with parity,
suggesting less desire for further children within
better educated communities. Similarly, the odds of
wanting another child drop substantially with the
community mean wealth quintile at all parities.
However, the decline in the odds ratio with higher
levels of community wealth does not get stronger
with the number of living children.
Parity 2 Parity 3 Parity 4 






















































































Figure 5 Estimated odds ratios for the likelihood of wanting an additional child, by parity, associated with
increasing women’s education and household wealth: women aged 15–49 in 34 SSA countries
Note: Vertical bars show 95 per cent confidence intervals.
Source: As for Figure 1.
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As a last step, we check the robustness of our
results to using several alternative key variables.
Supplementary Table A6 shows the relative effects
of education vs wealth, differentiating between two
measures of education at country level, which con-
firms that the findings are robust. Furthermore,
whereas we consider all women of reproductive age
in the main analysis, supplementary Tables A7 and
A8 present alternative regressions by marital status,
for ‘never in union’ vs ever-married women. The
results confirm the robust and relatively stronger
effect of education (vs wealth) in both subsamples,
even after controlling for spousal education.
Discussion and conclusion
The originality of this research lies in its analysis of
the relative effects of education and economic
resources on women’s fertility desires at individual,
community, and country levels. Using DHS data
for 34 SSA countries, we show that both individual
and community educational levels have a significant
dampening impact on women’s fertility desires. Thus,
our results confirm the findings of Kravdal (2002), as
well as Colleran and Snopkowski (2018), with regard
to actual fertility. Comparing the relative effects of
education and wealth, we find that education has a
stronger effect than wealth at all three levels, the
effects of both being statistically significant at the
individual and community levels. However, when
we include both variables at all levels in one
model, the importance of wealth is reduced, particu-
larly at the community level. At the same time, the
effect of education proves to be robust, even when
controlling for place of residence and marital
status, or using alternative parity-specific measures
of fertility intentions. This result confirms what has
been shown by a broad literature looking into the
relationship and causal links between women’s edu-
cational attainment and fertility (Jejeebhoy 1995;
Gustafsson 2001; Kravdal 2002; Bongaarts 2010). It
also provides several key findings. It proves at the
continental level (sub-Saharan Africa) that wealth
and place of residence fall short of explaining the
relationship between women’s education and ferti-
lity intentions. This, in turn, is a clear indication
that education does not only impact fertility inten-
tions through the economic endowment channelled
by education, as hinted at, for instance, by Cleland
and Wilson (1987). Still, the reasons for education
being more influential in determining fertility inten-
tions than other contextual parameters, such as
wealth and place of residence, remain under-
researched in the SSA context. Several studies
have shown that the association between wealth
Figure 6 Estimated odds ratios for the likelihood of wanting an additional child, by parity, associated with
increasing community MYS and community wealth quintile: women aged 15–49 in 34 SSA countries
Note: Vertical bars show 95 per cent confidence intervals. MYS =mean years of schooling.
Source: As for Figure 1.
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and fertility (realization in most cases) appears to be
heavily context-dependent, but is usually positive at
very high levels of fertility (Skirbekk 2008; Colleran
and Snopkowski 2018). Pointing at evidence from
small-scale, pre-transitional economies and arguing
from an evolutionary perspective, Kaplan (1996)
concluded that resource abundance leads to higher
fertility. However, this would mean that high-
income countries would experience the highest ferti-
lity of all, which is not the case. Obviously, there is a
turning point at which the effect of wealth on fertility
becomes negative.
To explain our results on household wealth, it is
worth revisiting Caldwell’s wealth flows theory
(Caldwell 1976); this can be related back to the
early work on the demographic transition by Notes-
tein (1945), whose hypothesis was that social and
economic development would bring fertility down
by changing parents’ aspirations and the role of chil-
dren. Caldwell argued that in traditional pre-transi-
tional societies, the intergenerational net flow of
resources goes from children to parents. Only later,
in transitional societies, does the direction of the
net flow reverse, leading to greater parental invest-
ments in children, accompanied by a smaller
number of children. While this theory has been
widely disputed, for instance with regard to the
measurement of flows (Kaplan 1994), Caldwell’s
emphasis on social changes that lead to changing
demand for children, while simultaneously concen-
trating greater family concern on the children, has
not been disproven empirically.
These potential explanations are important in the
context of our work. Most of the SSA countries in
our sample are transitional societies, undergoing
profound social changes—such as the spread of
mass education—which influence cultural norms
and modes of behaviour, but also numeracy about
family size. As Etienne van de Walle put it in his
1992 Presidential Address to the Population Associ-
ation of America (Van de Walle 1992), ‘the percep-
tion of a particular family size as a goal in a long-
term strategy of couples may be a cultural trait
present in some places and times but not in others’.
Our results lend support to a cognition-driven
theory of demographic transition, where changes in
the educational attainment of some women create
a vanguard of change in terms of fertility intentions
and subsequent actual fertility. The newly adopted
norms are then shared and transmitted within com-
munities to those less exposed to education.
What we demonstrate here as well—paraphrasing
Kravdal (2002)—is that education at the community
level has an effect on a woman’s fertility intentions
above and beyond that of her own education. The
predominant effect of community-level average edu-
cation, compared with community-level average
wealth and place of residence, could be explained
by social spillover effects which, for instance, would
lead uneducated women living in an educated com-
munity to pursue a different fertility career compared
with uneducated women living in an uneducated
community. However, our results also imply that
neighbouring populations are more homogenous in
terms of wealth than in terms of education.
From a policy point of view, the fact that education
is more determinant for the reduction in fertility
intentions than wealth is rather good news, because
education is usually a direct public investment,
whereas wealth accumulation is the outcome of a
more complex process, involving many factors that
cannot easily be influenced by policy.
Education as a dominant factor in desired fertility
and, in turn, actual fertility in SSA has clear impli-
cations: improvements in women’s education on
the subcontinent will be important in accelerating
the fertility transition. The speed of these changes
will strongly influence population growth in the
mid to long term. While population momentum
guarantees further population growth at least until
the middle of the century, SSA could show very
different fertility patterns thereafter, depending on
the educational investments made in future. Further-
more, and as shown by Bongaarts (2020), combined
with increasing education, the availability of family
planning programmes could reduce wanted (as well
as unwanted) fertility.
This paper has some limitations that are in part
inherent to the data used. The indicator chosen to
evaluate family planning services, the FPEI index,
does not show much variation across countries and
was chosen mainly because of the lack of other inter-
national supply-side indicators. A second limitation is
that we used cross-sectional data and cannot infer a
causal relationship between a change in any of the
independent variables and the desired number of
children. In order not to complicate the analysis, we
limited the number of variables to those essential
for our research question. As a result, we may have
missed some variables that could be of importance,
such as women’s labour force participation and
level of autonomy, or the survival of children born
prior to survey date. Adding such further potential
determinants of fertility intentions could be the
task for further work, alongside monitoring how
the relationship between education and fertility will
evolve in the SSA context as these countries move
to the later stages of the demographic transition.
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